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EXTRADITION.

THE policy of returning for trial and punishment the criminal of

THE

one country who has escaped to another, is not less manifest

than its justice. It would seem, therefore, that there ought to be no

great difficulty in agreeing upon the proper international regulations

for the purpose. This, however, has until recently been practically

an impossibility. While the leading nations of Christendom were

engaged for a very large proportion of the time in inflicting upon

each other all the mischief possible, it was not to be expected that

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW.

they would be solicitous to assist in the enforcement of their respect-

ive criminal laws. Indeed the opposite course was to be looked for;

that they would harbor fugitives for the mischief they had done or

JULY, 1876.

might do to other nations rather than return them for punishment.

Moreover a sentiment has prevailed that something of national

dignity and importance was involved in the state furnishing a secure

refuge and asylum to the fugitives from other lands, and in its resist-

EXT R A D I T ION.

ing any thing which might seem like an extension of the authority

of a foreign power to seize and punish persons beyond its borders.

If the subject is dispassionately considered, the conclusion is of

course inevitable, that any nation is interested in not becoming,

actively or passively, the protector for the criminals of other nations.

The recognition of this fact will always be sufficiently prompt and

decided when any nation is found to be getting rid of its criminals

Generated for guest (University of Michigan) on 2013-06-18 21:18 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b3057591
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

by banishing them to the dominions of its neighbors; and persistence

in a course of that description would be quite certain to lead to inter-

national difficulties. One would suppose, therefore, that the country

which was made one of refuge for offenders would be the one most

solicitous to form engagements for their return and punishment,

T

HE poli~ of returning for trial and punishment the criminal of
one country who has escaped to another, is not less manifest
than its justice. It would seem, therefore, that there ought to be no
great difficulty in agreeing upon the proper international regulations
for the purpose. This, ho:wever, has until recently been practically
an impossibility. \Vhile the leading nations of Christendom were
engaged for a very large proportion of the time in inflicting upon
each other all the mischief possible, it was not to be expected that
they would be solicitous to assist in the enforcement of their respective criminal laws. Indeed the opposite course was to be looked for;
that they would harbor fugitives for the mischief they had done or
might do to other nations rather than return them for punishment.
Moreover a sentiment has prevailed that something of national
dignity and importance was involved in the state furnishing a secure
refuge and asylum to the fugitives from other lands, and in its resisting any thing which might seem like an extension of the authority
of a foreign power to seize and punish persons beyond its borders.
If the subject is dispassionately considered, the conclusion is of
course inevitable, that any nation is interested in not becoming,
actively or passively, the protector for the criminals of other nations.
The recognition of this fact will always be sufficiently prompt and
decided when any nation is found to be getting rid of its criminals
by banishing them to the dominions of its neighbors; and persistencp.
in a course of that description would be quite certain to lead to international difficulties. One would suppose, therefore, that the country
which was made one of refuge for offenders would be the one most
solicitous to form engagements for their return and punishment,
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especially if this should appear to be the most feasible method of
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getting rid of them. Undoubtedly any country might provide by

municipal law for sending beyond its limits any alien found within

them who had been guilty of crime abroad; but an attempt to

determine the criminality would involve difficult, expensive and often

futile inquiries into the facts transpiring in other countries, and there

would be likelihood of the banishment being regarded as an un-

friendly act by the country into which, without its request, the

criminal should be driven. Some previous international arrangement

is therefore essential, and the proper arrangement is obviously one

under which the accused person may be returned, for the purposes of

a trial, on the demand of the sovereignty whose law has been violated.

The difficulties attending proper treaties for extradition are to be

found first, in agreeing upon the proper cases for their application,

and second, in determining the principles and machinery for their

enforcement. Where federal government exists there may be some

peculiar difficulties also.

I. As regards the cases to which such treaties should apply, refer-

ence may be made to the internal regulations of this country. The

United States, by their Constitution, undertook to cover all cases by

a general provision that " A person charged in any state with treason,

felony, or other crime" who should flee from justice to another state,

should be delivered up; but this very comprehensive provision could

never have been intended for literal enforcement, and certainly never

had such enforcement. It is true that the Federal Supreme Court

declared in one case that all acts made criminal by state law were
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within the contemplation of this provision, but the states never fully

recognized the doctrine, and in some noted instances refused to act

upon it. The Constitution provided no means for its enforcement

against unwilling State officials, and the latter declined to respond to

a demand for the surrender of a fugitive if in their opinion the act of

which he was accused ought not to be made criminal.

The treaty of 1842, between the United States and Great Britain,

was more specific in pointing out the cases in which fugitives should

be returned. The cases specified were those of " persons charged

with murder, or assault with intent to commit murder, or piracy, or

arson, or robbery, or forgery, or the utterance of forged paper."

Later treaties with other countries have enlarged this list very

greatly; that of 1868 with Italy embracing murder, and the attempt

to commit murder, rape, arson, piracy, mutiny on shipboard, burglary,

robbery, forgery, counterfeiting and the uttering of forged or coun-

especially if this should appear to be the most feasible method of
getting rid of them. Undoubtedly any country might provide by
municipal law for sending beyond its limits any alien found within
them who had been guilty of crime abroad; but an attempt to
determine the criminality would involve difficult, expensive and often
futile inquiries into the facts transpiring in other countries, and there
would be likelihood of the banishment being regarded as an unfriendly act by the country into which, without its request, the
criminal should be driven. Some previous international arrangement
is therefore essential, and the proper arrangement is obviously one
under which the accused person may be returned, for the purposes of
a trial, on the demand of the sovereignty whose law has been violated.
The difficulties attending proper treaties for extradition are to be
found first, in agreeing upon the proper cases for their application,
and second, in determining the principles and machinery for their
enforcement. Where federal government exists there may be some
peculiar difficulties also.
I. As regards the cases to which such treaties should apply, reference may be made to the internal regulations of this country. The
United States, by their Constitution, undertook to cover all cases by
a general provision that" A person charged in any state with treason,
felony, or otlur crime," who should flee from justice to another state,
should be delivered up; but this very comprehensive provision could
never have been intended for literal enforcement, and certainly never
had such enforcement. It is true that the Federal Supreme Court
declared in one case that all acts made criminal by state law were
within the contemplation of this provision, but the states never fully
recognized the doctrine, and in some noted instances refused to act
upon it. The Constitution provided no means for its enforcement
against unwilling State officials, and the latter declined to respond to
a demand for the surrender of a fugitive if in their opinion the act of
which he was accused ought not to be made criminal.
The treaty of 1842, between the United States and Great Britain,
was more specific in pointing out the cases in which fugitives should
be returned. The cases specified were those of "persons charged
with murder, or assault with intent to commit murder, or piracy, or
arson, or robbery, or forgery, or the utterance of forged paper."
Later treaties with other countries have enlarged this list very
greatly; that of 1868 with Italy embracing murder, and the attempt
to commit murder, rape, arson, piracy, mutiny on shipboard, burglary,
robbery, forgery, counterfeiting and the uttering of forged or coun-
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terfeit coin, paper, etc., embezzlement by public officers and by
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clerks, etc. It will be perceived that even the latter list fails to

embrace many offenses that would be punished by the contracting

powers respectively, and it is reasonable to conclude that such offenses

are excluded because not regarded as proper subjects of treaty regu-

lations. That many of them should be excluded will be apparent

when they are mentioned.

1. The offenses which Blackstone not very felicitously styles

"offenses against God and religion," must be excluded from extradi-

tion treaties for the very obvious reason that no two countries agree

exactly as to the acts which constitute offenses of this class. Indeed

even among Christian nations some things are looked upon as a duty

by one which another regards as such an offense to the Deity as

human laws ought to punish; and it is only necessary to suppose the

case of a treaty of extradition between Germany and France, or Great

Britain and Spain, and it is perceived at once that an attempt to aid

each other in the enforcement of their respective laws on these sub-

jects would only originate difficulties instead of obviating them, and

lead to national quarrels in the attempt to punish individual offenders.

2. A similar difficulty, though less serious in its probable results,

would be encountered in the case of offenses against the marriage

laws. In these cases, also, there is no general agreement, and as to

some of them the differences are as positive and decided as in the

case of offenses against the religious establishments or regulations of

different countries. Even in the American Union these differences

are sufficiently marked to be troublesome. A man would be punished
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in one state for marrying his step-daughter, but in another he may do

so lawfully. Some states forbid the guilty party to a divorce from

marrying again; in others such prohibitions are looked upon as preju-

dicial to public morals. International regulations on the subject

would encounter still greater difficulties; for while one nation might

demand that the man who had married his deceased wife's sister

should be delivered up to punishment, another which recognized

polygamy might insist upon provisions under which the second or

the twentieth wife fleeing from the harem should be dragged back to

the justice of the bow-string.

3. No nation can reasonably be expected to assist in the punish-

ment of offenses against the revenue laws of another. Very many of

those laws are really framed in a spirit of hostility to the interests of

other nations, and this to such an extent that their evasion seems not

only justifiable but in many cases commendable. A country whose

terfeit coin, paper, etc., embezzlement by public officers and by
clerks, etc. It will be perceived that even the latter list fails to
embrace many offenses that would be punished by the contracting
powers respectively, and it is reasonable to conclude that such offenses
are excluded because not regarded as proper subjects of treaty regulations. That many of them should be excluded will be apparent
when they are mentioned.
I. The offenses which Blackstone not very felicitously styles
"offenses against God and religion," must be excluded from extradition treaties for the very obvious reason that no two countries agree
exactly as to the acts which constitute offenses of this class. Indeed
even among Christian nations some things are looked upon as a duty
by one which another regards as such an offense to the Deity as
human laws ought to punish; and it is only necessary to suppose the
case of a treaty of extradition between Germany and France, or Great
Britain and Spain, and it is perceived at once that an attempt to aid
each other in the enforcement of their respective laws on these subjects would only originate difficulties instead of obviating them, and
lead to national quarrels in the attempt to punish individual offenders.
2. A similar difficulty, though less serious in its probable results,
would be encountered in the case of offenses against the marriage
laws. In these cases, also, there is no general agreement, and as to
some of them the differences are as positive and decided as in the
case of offenses against the religious establishments or regulations of
different countries. Even in the American Union these differences
are sufficiently marked to be troublesome. A man would be punished
in one state for marrying his step-daughter, but in another he may do
so lawfully. Some states forbid the guilty party to a divorce from
marrying again; in others such prohibitions are looked upon as prejudicial to public morals. International regulations on the subject
would encounter still greater difficulties; for while one nation might
demand that the man who had married his deceased wife's sister
should be delivered up to punishment, another which recognized
polygamy might insist upon provisions under which the second or
the twentieth wife fleeing from the harem should be dragged back to
the justice of the bow-string.
3. No nation can reasonably be expected to assist in the punishment of offenses against the revenue laws of another. Very many of
those laws are really framed in a spirit of hostility to the interests of
other nations, and this to such an extent that their evasion seems not
,only justifiable but in many cases commendable. A country \\·hose
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industry is discriminated against by the protective duties of another

EXTRADITION.

would be more likely to retaliate than to assist in their enforcement,

and the common law which was somewhat scrupulous in denouncing

contracts made in circumvention of the law, would even lend its aid

in the enforcement of those which contemplated the evasion of the

revenue laws of other countries. Cases of smuggling, therefore, and

all cases of the class must be excluded from treaties of extra-

dition.

4. Political offenses must also be excluded for reasons equally

apparent. The most serious political offenses often fail of justifica-

tion only because they are not successful, and the nation against

which they are committed is justified in punishing them not because

they are morally wrong, but because the existence and stability of

the government seem to depend upon it. The sympathies of the

world must be expected to go with the leader of an unsuccessful

revolution, provided he seems to have been influenced in his action

by patriotic motives, and to have had a reasonable prospect of better-

ing his country by his success. And manifestly a republic could not

assist in the punishment of a revolt against despotism, nor a believer

in the divine right of kings be expected to aid in punishing those

who had unsuccessfully attempted the overthrow of a democracy.

5. Without further attempt at specific classification, it may be said

generally that all offenses must be excepted that are not by the com-

mon consent of civilized nations denounced as malum in se. If with

one nation an act is malum prohibitum only; if it is denounced on

grounds of policy peculiar to that nation, or of morality and justice
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that other nations do not recognize, it is plain that it can not be

covered by a treaty of extradition. Certain nations may make their

engagements more comprehensive than others, because they agree

more perfectly in their views and sentiments; but the statement

above made is sufficiently accurate for all practical purposes.

II. In providing machinery for the enforcement of an extradition

treaty, the following particulars would seem to be requisite:

1. A provision for prompt arrest on mere accusation. This will

sometimes work injustice, but without it a treaty would be too easily

evaded to be of much value.

2. Without unnecessary delay there should be required in the

country of the offense a judicial investigation that should determine

whether a case existed which was within the treaty, and if so, should

be the basis of the demand for surrender.

3. In the country of arrest there should also be a judicial inquiry,

industry is discriminated against by the protective duties of another
would be more likely to retaliate than to assist in their enforcement,
and the common law which was somewhat scrupulous in denouncing
contracts made in circumvention of the law, would even lend its aid
in the enforcement of those which contemplated the evasion of the
revenue laws of other countries. Cases of smuggling, therefore, and
all cases of the class must be excluded from treaties of extra-'
clition.
4. Political offenses must also be excluded for reasons equally
apparent. The most serious political offenses often fail of justification only because they are not successful, and the nation against
which they are committed is justified in punishing them not because
they are morally wrong, but because the existence and stability of
the government seem to depend upon it. The sympathies of the
world must be expected to go with the leader of an unsuccessful
rc,"olution, provided he seems to have been influenced in his action
by patriotic motives, and to have had a reasonable prospect of bettering his country by his success. And manifestly a republic could not
assist in the punishment of a revolt against despotism, nor a believer
in the divine right of kings be expected to aid in punishing those
who had unsuccessfully attempted the overthrow of a democracy.
5. Without further attempt at specific classification, it may be said
generally that all offenses must be excepted that are not by the common consent of civilized nations denounced as malum in se. If with
one nation an act is malum prohibitum only; if it is denounced on
grounds of policy peculiar to that nation, or of morality and justice
tbat other nations do not recognize, it is plain that it can not be
covered by a treaty of extradition. Certain nations may make their
engagements more comprehensive than others, because they agree
more perfectly in their views and sentiments; but the statement
above made is sufficiently accurate for all practical purposes.
II. In providing machinery for the enforcement of an extradition
treaty, the following particulars would seem to be requisite:
I. A provision for prompt arrest on mere accusation. This will
sometimes work injustice, but without it a treaty would be too easily
evaded to be of much value.
2. Without unnecessary delay there should be required in the
country of the offense a judicial investigation that should determine
whether a case existed which was within the treaty, and if so, should
be the basis of the demand for surrender.
3. In the country of arrest there should also be a judicial inquiry,
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as a basis for executive action in determining upon the propriety of

responding favorably to the demand.

4. Report of this inquiry should be made to the executive, and if

satisfactory, be followed by his warrant of extradition.

But careful provision for such proceedings can not preclude all

difficulty. It requires wise, cautious, dispassionate and just action to

prevent such controversies and collisions as that which recently

sprung up between the United States and Great Britain. Such

treaties are peculiarly susceptible of being perverted to purposes

never contemplated in making them. This may be made evident by

a few illustrations. The treaty of 1842, already alluded to, was silent

on the subject of political offenses, the intent being not to embrace

them. A participant in the late rebellion in this country, if he had

fled to Great Britain could therefore not have been demanded under

the treaty for his treason. Suppose, however, that our authorities,

instead of charging him with treason, had proceeded against him for

some other offense—say for murder in the killing of some Union

soldier. Here the charge would have been within the terms of the

treaty, and possibly the facts as detailed by witnesses and set forth

in the papers might have made out a case which was prima facie one

of criminal homicide properly designated murder. But here it would

be the manifest duty of the British Government to look beyond the

prima facie showing, and deal with the case as being what it was in

fact, one of a political nature. A case which actually occurred in

1860 is instructive. In that year a slave in Missouri, in order to effect

his escape, killed his master. This was murder in Missouri, but in
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Canada to which Tie fled, it was looked upon as an incident only in a

justifiable struggle for liberty, and the authorities refused to recognize

it as a case within the treaty. They would equally have refused to

recognize any offense which was really an offense against the slave

code, whatever might be the form of the charge. Suppose the treaty

had provided for the case of mutiny on shipboard, would our govern-

ment have expected Great Britain to recognize a rising of slaves

against the master who was transporting them from state to state, as

a case within the treaty? Certainly, now that we have abolished

slavery, our government would applaud any similar rising instead of

assisting in dealing with it as a crime.

Some other cases may be more difficult of solution, although the

facts, when closely examined, may give reason for the belief that the

very offense charged has been committed. It is notorious that the

power to extradite offenders as between the states is most grossly

as a basis for executive action in determining upon the propriety of
responding favorably to the demand.
4. Report of this inquiry should be made to the executive, and if
satisfactory, be followed by his warrant of extradition.
But careful provision for such proceedings can not preclude all
difficulty. It requires wise, cautious, dispassionate and just action to
prevent such controversies and collisions as that which recently
sprung up between the United States and Great Britain. Such
treaties are peculiarly susceptible of being perverted to purposes
never contemplated in making them. This may be made evident by
a few illustrations. The treaty of 1842, already alluded to, was silent
on the subject of political offenses, the intent being not to embrace
them. A participant in the late rebellion in this country, if he had
fled to Great Britain could therefore not have been demanded under
the treaty for his treason. Suppose, however, that our authorities,
instead of charging him with treason, had proceeded against him for
some other offense-say for murder in the killing of some Union
soldier. Here the charge would have been within the terms of the
treaty, and possibly the facts as detailed by witnesses and set forth·
in the papers might have made out a case which was prima facie one
of criminal homicide properly designated murder. But here it would
be the manifest duty of the British Government to look beyond the
prima facie showing, and deal with the case as being what it was in
fact, one of a political nature. A case which actually occurred in
1860 is instructive. In that year a slave in Missouri, in order to effect
his escape, killed his master. This was murder in Missouri, but in
Canada to which he fled, it was looked upon as an incident only in a
justifiable struggle for liberty, and the authorities refused to recognize
it as a case within the treaty. They would equally have refused to
recognize any offense which was really an offense against the slave
code, whatever might be the form of the charge. Suppose the treaty
had provided for the case of mutiny on shipboard, would our government have expected Great Britain to recognize a rising of slaves
against the master who was transporting them from state to state, as
a case within the treaty? Certainly, now that we have abolished
slavery, our government would applaud any similar rising instead of
assisting in dealing with it as a crime.
Some other cases may be more difficult of solution, although the
facts, when closely examined, may give reason for the belief that the
very offense charged has been committed. It is notorious that th~
power to extradite offenders as between the states is most grossly
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abused, particularly in those cases in which the charge is of obtaining

property by false pretenses. It is not a large estimate that in a

majority of cases what is sought is not public justice but the collec-

tion of a private debt. In some instances state governors, in

issuing their requisitions for the return of alleged fugitives, have

expressly made it a condition that the complainant should protect

the state against all expense; and Gen. Dix, when Governor of New

York, very properly refused to honor such a requisition because pre-

sumptively it was issued for a private and not for a public purpose.

Other accusations are made which the parties have no expectation of

substantiating, in order to bring persons in one state within the reach

of the civil process of another. Abuses of this nature require to be

carefully guarded against, and they may occur under extradition

treaties as well as under the internal regulations of our own country.

In these cases there may or may not be such an offense^as is charged;

the point is, that the process is not sued out to punish crime but to

collect a debt.

Protection against any such abuses must be found either first, in

the caution and vigilance of the judicial and executive authorities,

when making their inquiry into the facts before the surrender is

assented to, or second, in a recognition of the principle that the ex-

tradited party shall not be subject to prosecution on any other charge

than that to which he has been surrendered. If the vigilance of the

authorities is to be relied upon as security, it can not well go beyond

a careful inquiry into the facts in order to determine whether the

charge is made in good faith and on grounds apparently sufficient;
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but if the demand is refused when the case is prima facie sufficient,

the impugnment of good faith would be very likely to lead to diffi-

culty. A much more suitable and satisfactory security would be

found in the recognition of a principle that would preclude the parties

active in procuring a surrender from making use of the process for

purposes which they have not avowed.

The following provision in a treaty of extradition would be

perfectly reasonable: That a person delivered up as a fugitive

from justice should not be subject to trial or punishment in the

country receiving him, on any other than the charge specified in

the warrant of extradition, until that charge had been finally

disposed of, nor afterwards until he had had reasonable oppor-

tunity to return to the country extraditing him. The principle of

the following should also be assented to, though some exceptions

should probably be made: That he should for a like period be

abused, particularly in those cases in which the charge is of obtaining
property by false pretenses. I t is not a large estimate that in a
majority of cases what is sought is not public justice but the collection of a private debt. In some instances state governors, in
issuing their requisitions for the return of alleged fugitives, have
expressly made it a condition that the complainant should protect
the state against all expense; and Gen. Dix, when Governor of New
York, very properly refused to honor such a requisition because presumptively it was issued for a private and not for a public purpose.
Other accusations are made which the parties have no expectation of
substantiating, in order to bring persons in one state within the reach
of the civil process of another. Abuses of this nature require to be
carefully guarded against, and they may occur under extradition
treaties as well as under the internal regulations of our own country.
In these cases there mayor may not be such an offense.as is charged;
the point is, that the process is not sued out to punish crime but to
collect a debt.
Protection against any such abuses must be found either .first, in
the caution and vigilance of the judicial and executive authorities,
when making their inquiry into the facts before the surrender is
assented to, Qr second, in a recognition of the principle that the extradited party shall not be subject to prosecution on any other charge
than that to which he has been surrendered. If the vigilance of the
authorities is to be relied upon as security, it can not well go beyond
a careful inquiry into the facts in order to determine whether the
charge is made in good faith and on grounds apparently sufficient;
but if the demand is refused when the case is prima facie sufficient,
the impugnment of good faith would be very likely to lead to difficulty. A much more suitable and satisfactory security would be
found in the recognition of a principle that would preclude the parties
active in procuring a surrender from making use of the process for
purposes which they have not avowed.
The following provision in a treaty of extradition would be
perfectly reasonable: That a person delivered up as a fugitive
from justice should not be subject to trial or punishment in the
country receiving him, on any other than the charge specified in
the warrant of extradition, until that charge had been finally
disposed of, nor afterwards until he had had reasonable opportunity to return to the country extraditing him. The: principle of
the following should also be assented to, though some exceptions
should probably be made: That he should for a like period be
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exempt from civil process in the country to which he had been

439

forcibly returned.

There are cases in which the courts have recognized the princi-

ple that when a person is brought within the reach of judicial process

for one purpose, advantage can not be taken of his enforced presence

to serve him with process for another purpose. It is this principle

that protects parties attending as witnesses from being arrested on

the processes of local courts; and it is so perfectly reasonable that it

might well have been applied by analogy to the case of a party

extradited for one offense and then charged with another. But it

has not been so applied, and there were certain English precedents

in criminal cases that would have stood in the way. To give the

needed protection would consequently require one of two things:

1. An executive pledge, given on receiving the surrender of an accused

person, that he should be held only on the charge to which he was

surrendered; or 2. A treaty stipulation to that effect. Where federal

government exists an executive pledge would not alone be sufficient,

because it could not be enforced. In the United States, for example,

the several States and their judiciary are bound by all the stipulations

of the Federal Constitution, and by the laws and treaties made in

pursuance thereof; but the pledge of the federal executive is neither

constitution, law nor treaty, and therefore can not bind them.

The exemption of an extradited person from civil process ought

to be complete except in one contingency. If private wrongs which

would be the foundation of a suit at law, were connected with the

public wrong, and sprung from the same facts, and the offender is
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found guilty of the crime, it is no injustice, nor can there be abuse of

the proceeding, in holding him then subject to civil process for such

wrongs. But if the public prosecution is abandoned, or breaks down

on trial, there would be palpable wrong and almost certain abuse if

private parties might then take advantage of the proceedings for

their own purposes. Suppose, for example, a party is seized in Great

Britain and brought to America on a charge of robbery; if the charge

proves well founded, there is no good reason why the prosecutor

should not in a private suit recover the chattel or its value; but if

the public authorities ascertain that it is really no robbery, but only

a taking of property on a bona fide claim of title, and on this ground

abandon the proceedings, it would be a gross wrong to permit the

prosecutor to obtain a private remedy by thus subjecting his adver-

sary to great trouble and expense on an unfounded charge.

AH our existing extradition treaties are defective in the particular

exempt from civil process in the country to which he had been
forcibly returned.
There are cases in which the courts have recognized the principle that when a person is brought within the reach of judicial process
for one purpose, advantage can not be taken of his enforced presence
to serve him with process for another purpose. It is this principle
that protects parties attending as witnesses from being an"ested on
the processes of local courts: and it is so perfectly reasonable that it
might well have been applied by analogy to the case of a party
extradited for one offense and then charged with another. But it
has not been so applied, and there were certain English precedents
in criminal cases that would have stood in the way. To give the
needed protection would consequently require one of two things:
I. An executive pledge, given on receiving the surrender of an accused
person, that he should be held only on the charge to which he was
surrendered; or 2. A treaty stipulation to that effect. \Vhere federal
government exists an executive pledge would not alone be sufficient,
because it could not be enforced. In the United States, for example,
the several States and their judiciary are bound by all the stipulations
of the Federal Constitution, and by the laws and treaties made in
pursuance thereof; but the pledge of the federal executive is neither
constitution, law nor treaty, and therefore can not bind them.
The exemption of an extradited person from civil process ought
to be complete except in one contingency. If private wrongs which
would be the foundation of a suit at law, were connected with the
public wrong, and sprung from the same facts, and the offender is
found guilty of the crime, it is no injustice, nor can there be abuse of
the proceeding, in holding him then subject to civil process for such
wrongs. But if the public prosecution is abandoned, or breaks down
on trial, there would be palpable wrong and almost certain abuse if
private parties might then take advantage of the proceedings for
their own purposes. Suppose, for example, a party is seized in Great
Britain and brought to America on a charge of robbery; if the charge
proves well founded, there is no good reason why the prosecutor
should not in a private suit recover the chattel or its value; but if
the public authorities ascertain that it is really no robbery, but only
a taking of property on a bona fide claim of title, and on this ground
abandon the proceedings, it would be a gross wrong to permit the
prosecutor to obtain a private remedy by thus subjecting his adversary to great trouble and expense on an unfounded charge.
All our existing extradition treaties are defective in the particular
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indicated, and difficulties will be likely to arise until they are modi-

fied. And it is greatly to be regretted that the treaty with Great

Britain could not have been modified by prompt and cordial concur-

rence, thus saving the recent unfortunate controversy.

It may be thought that provisions, such as have been suggested,

would create embarrassment and lead to the escape of criminals in

cases where their crimes were numerous. Winslow, for example, is

supposed to have committed several offenses of the same nature,

though his extradition was demanded for one only. But it would be

easy to provide for such cases all the distinct inquiries that are neces-

sary to cover them, and even to provide for independent inquiries

afterwards if offenses should subsequently come to light. What is

important is that the government, consenting to surrender a person

who is within its jurisdiction, should have the opportunity of satisfy-

ing itself, by means of the inquiries of its own officers, that it is not

being made the instrument of wrong and oppression, or of punishing

acts which its own people do not look upon as criminal.

At the time we write the correspondence between our govern-

ment and that of Great Britain, concerning the case of Winslow, is

not published, or indeed concluded, and it is impossible to make it

the subject of intelligent discussion. So far as we are able to judge

from all that has found its way into the public prints, the British

government would seem to have been contending for the principle

that the country which consents to extradite an accused person is

entitled to be assured that he is demanded for trial on the charge set

forth in the papers and on no other. As the principle is sound, the
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government can not be blamed for endeavoring to secure it. But as

has already been stated, our own government is powerless to give the

requisite security unless a treaty provides for it, and the existing

treaty with Great Britain does not. Were Winslow to be returned,

he would pass at once into the hands of the judiciary, and cease to

be under executive control. The President, consequently, could not

if he would, prevent the accused from being compelled to respond to

ordinary process either civil or criminal. What the British govern-

ment should have done, therefore, was to ask an amendment of the

treaty, instead of making inadmissible demands under it. And it

was particularly unfortunate that Winslow's case was made the occa-

sion for controversy, since there was not the slightest reason, so far

as we are aware, for charging or suspecting bad faith in the demand

for his surrender.

indicated, and difficulties will be likely to arise until they are modified. And it is greatly to be regretted that the treaty with Great
Britain could not have been modified by prompt and cordial concurrence, thus saving the recent unfortunate controversy.
It may be thought that provisions, such as have been suggested,
would create embarrassment and lead to the escape of criminals in
cases where their crimes were numerous. Winslow, for example, is
supposed to have committed several offenses of the same nature,
though his extradition was demanded for one only. But it would be
easy to provide for such cases all the distinct inquiries that are necessary to cover them, and even to provide for independent inquiries
afterwards if offenses should subsequently come to light. \\That is
important is that the government, consenting to surrender a person
who is within its jurisdiction, should have the opportunity of satisfying itself, by means of the inquiries of its own officers, that it is not
being made the instrument of wrong and oppression, or of punishing
acts which its own people do not look upon as criminal.
At the time we write the correspondence between our government and that of Great Britain, concerning the case of Winslow, is
not published, or indeed concluded, and it is impossible to make it
the suJjject of intelligent discussion. So far as we are able to judge
from all that has found its way into the public prints, the British
government would seem to have been contending for the principle
that the country which consents to extradite an accused person is
entitled to be assured that he is demanded for trial ~m the charge set
forth in the papers and on no other. As the principle is sound, the
government can not be blamed for endeavoring to secure it. But as
has already been stated, our own government is powerless to give the
requisite security unless a treaty provides for it, and the existing
treaty with Great Britain does not. Were Winslow to be returned,
he would pass at once into the hands of the judiciary, and cease to
be under executive control. The President, consequently, could not
if he would, prevent the accused from being compelled to respond to
ordinary process either civil or criminal. \Vhat the British government should have done, therefore. was to ask an amendment of the
treaty, instead of making inadmissible demands under it. And it
was particularly unfortunate that Winslow's case was made the occasion for controversy, since there was not the slightest reason, so far
as we are aware, for charging or suspecting bad faith in the demand
for his surrender.
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